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Abstract
I evaluate the e ects on student achievement of the Teacher Advancement
Program (TAP), a school-level intervention that o ers teachers professional
development resources and performance-based compensation. Because TAP
typically targets low-performing schools, assignment to the intervention is non-
random. I use synthetic control matching methods to identify appropriate
comparison units. I then use a di erence-in-di erences model to estimate the
e ects of TAP on state achievement exam scores in reading and mathematics.
I ﬁnd that students in TAP schools outperform students in comparison schools
by roughly 0.15 standard deviations in mathematics. I ﬁnd smaller and less
precisely estimated e ects on reading achievement.
Keywords: teacher pay, performance-based pay, synthetic control
matching
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Introduction
For the vast majority of U.S. public school teachers, pay is a function of just two
variables. Take the highest academic degree a teacher has earned and the number of
years she has spent teaching, and together they determine her salary. More than 96
percent of public school districts pay teachers according to a single salary schedule of
this form (Podgursky 2007).
Though educational attainment and teaching experience are the primary deter-
minants of teachers’ salaries, recent economic literature has established that neither
factor is a signiﬁcant predictor of teacher quality. Students of teachers with graduate
degrees perform no better on average than students of teachers without them, and
the e ects of experience on student achievement appear insigniﬁcant in all but the
ﬁrst two years of a teacher’s career (Aaronson et al. 2007, Rivkin et al. 2005, Rocko 
2004). Payments for teacher education and experience also come at great expense to
public schools. The average school spends more than 20 percent of its teacher wage
bill on automatic salary augmentations for education and experience alone (Ballou
and Podgursky 2002).
In light of evidence that current contracts reward teachers for inputs unrelated
to student achievement, political pressure to reform teacher compensation schemes
is mounting. Many reformers have called on schools to tie teacher pay directly to
student performance. Under a performance-based pay scheme, schools would use test
scores, classroom evaluations, and other measures of teacher productivity to deter-
mine teacher pay. Since evidence on the e ects of performance-based pay is still
limited, the federal government has appropriated billions of dollars to ﬁnance and
evaluate performance-based pay programs. In 2006, Congress created the Teacher
Incentive Fund (TIF), an initiative that awards grants to districts and states that
implement performance-based pay programs. The Department of Education has also
allocated $4.35 billion for the Race to the Top Fund, a program that awards state-levelSally Hudson 2
grants for major education reforms. The ﬁrst round of grants were awarded in March
for proposals from Delaware and Tennessee, both of which contained performance-
based pay elements (U.S. Department of Education 2010).
But support for performance-based pay is by no means unanimous. Florida Gov-
ernor Charlie Crist vetoed a bill in April that would have tied both teacher pay and
tenure to measured student achievement (Gabriel and Cave 2010). Another mea-
sure has been tabled in Georgia’s state legislature (Torres 2010). In both states,
performance-based pay legislation has been met with staunch opposition from teach-
ers’ unions. Many teachers question the potential for performance-based compensa-
tion to improve public education and fear its repercussions for existing employees.
Given the controversy over teacher compensation, it is critical that policy-makers
draw on sound evidence from existing performance-based pay programs as they de-
sign new reforms. Toward this end, I present an empirical evaluation of the Teacher
Advancement Program (TAP), the largest performance-based pay intervention in the
United States. Because TAP typically operates in low-performing schools, assign-
ment to the intervention is non-random. I therefore use synthetic control methods to
identify appropriate comparison units in this non-experimental setting. I then exploit
variation in the timing of TAP participation to estimate the program’s e ects on stu-
dent achievement using a di erence-in-di erences framework. I ﬁnd that students in
TAP schools outperform students in synthetic controls by roughly 0.15 standard de-
viations on state achievement exams in mathematics. I ﬁnd smaller and less precisely
estimated e ects on reading achievement.
In the following section, I describe the TAP model and its performance-based
compensation scheme. I then review the existing literature on performance-based
teacher pay and synthetic control methods. After describing my data sources and
empirical strategy, I present my results. I conclude by comparing my results to those
of other education reforms and providing some basic cost-beneﬁt analysis.Sally Hudson 3
Background on TAP
Launched in 1999 by the Milken Family Foundation, TAP is an education interven-
tion aimed at helping schools recruit, train, and retain e ective teachers. Arizona was
the ﬁrst state to implement TAP, selecting ﬁve schools to participate in the 2000-2001
school year. Since then, 17 states and the District of Columbia have implemented
TAP in at least one school. TAP is currently active in 227 schools nationwide. These
schools serve more than 85,000 students and employ more than 7,500 teachers.
Though TAP maintains a relationship with the Milken Family Foundation, it now
operates under the administrative purview of the National Institute for Excellence in
Teaching (NIET), a 501(c)(3) public charity established in 2005. The NIET receives
ﬁnancial support from both private and public sources, including the U.S. Depart-
ment of Education. Participating schools fund TAP through their local budgets and
external grants from programs like the Teacher Incentive Fund.
The TAP model has four essential elements: (1) multiple teaching career paths,
(2) ongoing applied professional growth, (3) instructionally focused accountability,
and (4) performance-based compensation.1 The goal of the ﬁrst element is to al-
low schools’ strongest teachers to assume greater leadership roles without leaving the
classroom altogether. TAP schools identify two types of specialized instructors called
“Master” and “mentor” teachers. Master teachers work closely with administrators
to measure and analyze student performance. They also observe classroom instruc-
tion, lead teacher development groups, and teach model lessons. Mentor teachers
assist other members of the TAP leadership team in evaluating teachers and pro-
viding regular feedback about instructional practices. Master and mentor teachers
are selected through competitive, performance-based assessments conducted by both
internal and external evaluators, and they are compensated for their additional work.
In the 2009-2010 school year, TAP recommended salary augmentations ranging from
1For further explanation of the TAP model, see Solmon et al. (2006) and NIET (2010).Sally Hudson 4
$10,000 - 20,000 for Master teachers and $5,000 - 12,000 for mentor teachers.
The second TAP element is ongoing applied professional growth. These programs
may vary some across schools so that each school can focus on the speciﬁc needs of its
teachers and students. In general, TAP schools organize teachers in “cluster groups”
by grade and subject. Master teachers lead these groups in instructional exercises,
peer feedback sessions, and examining data on student achievement.
The third TAP element is instructionally focused accountability. Principals and
Master teachers perform classroom evaluations of every instructor at least four to six
times each year. At least half of these evaluations must be unannounced. Evaluators
assess teachers using the TAP Instructional Rubric, a set of clearly deﬁned standards
that promote speciﬁc teaching practices. To ensure objectivity, TAP administrators
train and certify evaluators annually and track the reliability of ratings across eval-
uators. Every evaluation includes immediate feedback for the instructor after the
session. Teachers then use the results to guide their professional development and
cluster group work.
TAP schools also use instructional evaluations to determine performance-based
compensation, the fourth TAP element. Schools calculate performance awards using
three measures of teacher performance: instructional evaluations, teacher-level value
added scores, and school-level value added scores. Schools derive individual evalua-
tion scores from the Rubric described above. These scores are then averaged across
all evaluations to produce a single score between 1 and 5.
To calculate value-added scores, schools outsource data from standardized achieve-
ment exams to SAS Institute Inc., a for-proﬁt software and analytics ﬁrm. The
SAS Institute uses SAS
R   EVAAS
R  , a value-added model developed by Dr. William
Sanders of the University of Tennessee. In calculating value-added scores, SAS
R  
EVAAS
R   ﬁrst estimates average annual achievement growth in each grade and sub-
ject using test scores from a reference population of both TAP and non-TAP teach-Sally Hudson 5
ers. It then uses a ﬁxed e ects model to estimate how students of each TAP teacher
perform relative to these average growth ﬁgures. SAS
R   EVAAS
R   only calculates
value-added scores for teachers with at least 10 student test score observations in the
given year. Teachers who serve students in multiple tested subjects or grades receive
separate ﬁxed e ect estimates for each group. These estimates are then weighted by
group size to determine a single estimate for each teacher.2
SAS
R   EVAAS
R   converts each teacher’s value-added estimate to a discrete score
from 1 to 5. Teachers with ﬁxed e ect estimates more than two standard errors below
the reference average earn a score of 1. Teachers whose estimates fall between one
and two standard errors below the average receive a score of 2. Teachers who earn
a score of 3 have estimates within one standard error of the average, while scores of
4 and 5 are awarded to teachers whose estimates are at least one and two standard
errors above the average, respectively. SAS
R   EVAAS
R   uses a similar procedure to
calculate school-level value-added estimates and assigns each TAP school a score from
1 to 5, as well.
Each teacher’s total performance award is then determined as follows. TAP
schools contribute a ﬁxed dollar amount for each teacher toward a pool of bonus
funding. This amount typically ranges from $2500 - 3000. Schools create separate
pools for teachers with and without individual value-added scores so that all teachers
can qualify for the same total bonus regardless of whether they teach tested subjects.
Table 1 displays how schools allocate funding for each award component within these
pools. For all teachers, 50 percent of the bonus pool is allocated for awards based
on instructional evaluations. For teachers without individual value-added scores, the
remaining 50 percent is dedicated to school value-added awards, while teachers with
value-added scores can qualify for both individual and school-level bonuses.3
2For a more thorough discussion of the SAS
R   EVAAS
R   model, see Solmon et al. (2006).
3Administrators in some TAP schools also receive awards for school-level performance, but these
funds are drawn from a separate pool.Sally Hudson 6
Table 1: Portion of Pool Reserved for Each Award Component
Teachers with Teachers without
Value-Added Value-Added
Award Component Scores Scores
Instructional Evaluations 50 % 50 %
Teacher Value-Added 30 % 0 %
School Value-Added 20 % 50 %
Teachers must qualify for each component of their bonus separately. Table 2
presents the minimum qualifying scores for each component by teacher type. Note
that Master and mentor teachers must attain higher instructional evaluation scores
than traditional teachers to qualify for the instructional component of their bonus.
Teachers who qualify for a given component split the corresponding portion of the
bonus pool. For example, all teachers who earn an individual value-added score of 3
or higher split the 30 percent of funding allocated for these bonuses. Higher scores
earn teachers a greater share of the pool. I omit the explicit calculations here and
present a detailed example in Appendix 1.
There are several key points to highlight when considering how TAP’s performance
awards a ect teachers’ incentives. First, TAP uses absolute measures of performance
to determine bonuses rather than relative rankings so as not to encourage competition
among teachers. Still, every additional teacher who qualiﬁes for a bonus reduces the
award value for every other qualifying teacher since they each receive a share of the
same pool of funding. Indeed, as the Appendix example illustrates, teachers’ bonuses
may depend heavily on the performance of their colleagues. Second, TAP errs on the
side of awarding lots of bonuses since all teachers with scores of 3 or higher qualify
for value-added awards. That said, teachers with higher scores earn larger bonuses,
so there are incentives to both meet and exceed the qualifying thresholds. Finally,
TAP instructs schools not to publicize the list of bonus recipients or the size of their
awards. All teachers know if their school qualiﬁes for a value-added bonus, but theySally Hudson 7
Table 2: Minimum Qualifying Scores for Performance Awards
Mentor Master
Award Component Teachers Teachers Teachers
Instructional Evaluations 2.5 3.5 4
Teacher Value-Added 3 3 3
School Value-Added 3 3 3
should not know the bonus status of their colleagues. Consequently, TAP’s compen-




I now review the existing literature on performance-based teacher pay. Though few
empirical evaluations have been conducted, the theoretical implications of performance-
based pay are fairly straightforward. Lazear (2003) proposes two primary mechanisms
through which performance-based pay may improve student achievement. First, per-
formance awards increase the return to teacher income of activities that improve mea-
sured achievement, thereby incentivizing teachers to invest time and e ort in these
activities. Second, awards increase the expected value of wages for high-performing
teachers, so these individuals should be more likely to seek jobs at schools that of-
fer performance-based pay. Consequently, performance awards may a ect both the
productivity of existing faculty and the composition of new faculty at participating
schools.
Most of the existing literature on performance-based pay has focused on the ﬁrst
of these channels. Glewwe et al. (2008) analyze the short-term e ects of merit
pay using a randomized intervention in rural Kenyan primary schools. The programSally Hudson 8
o ered bonuses to teachers based on their schools’ average scores on district-wide ex-
ams. Awards ranged in value from 21 to 43 percent of the average teacher’s monthly
salary. The authors ﬁnd that students in treatment schools scored 0.14 standard
deviations higher on average than students in control schools. Achievement gains
exceeded 0.34 standard deviations in geography and history, subjects which required
the most rote memorization, the authors argue. Though the program succeeded in
improving student performance, its e ects were short-lived. The authors ﬁnd no sig-
niﬁcant di erences in achievement between treatment and control schools after the
intervention was discontinued.
Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2009) conducted a more complex randomized
trial in rural India. They assigned treatment schools to two separate interventions.
Teachers in 100 schools were o ered awards based on school-level performance, while
teachers in 100 other schools were o ered awards based solely on their own students’
test scores. In both cases, awards were valued at roughly 3 percent of a typical
teacher’s annual salary. At the end of the program’s second year, students in treat-
ment schools outperformed students in control schools by 0.16 and 0.28 standard
deviations in language and mathematics, respectively. The authors ﬁnd the largest
achievement gains in teacher-level incentive schools, suggesting that individual incen-
tives are more e ective than group incentives in improving teacher performance. The
authors also identify signiﬁcant achievement gains in subjects for which no awards
were o ered, suggesting that performance-based pay may generate positive spillovers.
Other authors have attempted to estimate the e ects of performance-based pay
using non-experimental methods. Lavy (2002, 2009) analyzes two merit pay inter-
ventions in Israeli high schools. Both interventions determined awards through rank-
order tournaments, paying bonuses to only the top performers. The ﬁrst intervention
was aimed at reducing schools’ drop out rates and raising their pass rates on high
school matriculation exams. The top one-third of schools demonstrating improve-Sally Hudson 9
ments received lump sum awards to be distributed evenly among their teachers. The
largest awards were valued at roughly 3 percent of the average teacher’s salary. Lavy
ﬁnds these group incentives induced signiﬁcant reductions in drop out rates, but had
no signiﬁcant e ects on exam performance. The second intervention o ered teachers
individual awards for their students’ matriculation exam scores. Bonuses were sub-
stantially larger in the second tournament, ranging in value from 6 to 25 percent of
the average teacher’s annual salary. Lavy identiﬁes signiﬁcant improvements in mean
exams scores following the second intervention. His ﬁndings reinforce the notion that
awards based on individual teacher performance may have stronger e ects on student
achievement than awards based on group-level outcomes, though it is di cult to ac-
count for the di erence in bonus sizes.
All of the aforementioned studies estimate the short-run e ects of performance-
based pay on the productivity of existing faculty. Few studies have attempted to
document the long-run e ects of performance-based pay on the employment of high-
performing teachers, largely because few merit pay interventions have lasted long
enough to allow for gradual changes in teacher sorting. Indeed, there is so little vari-
ation in teacher pay in the United States that few reliable studies on the relationship
between o ered salaries and teacher quality have been conducted. Hoxby and Leigh
(2004) o er evidence that the absence of di erentiated teacher pay has driven many
high-aptitude4 individuals out of teaching. The authors decompose the incentives
to leave teaching into two factors: the “pull” of higher wages in other occupations
and the “push” of pay compression in teaching. Using variation in unionization laws
to capture the “push” e ect, they estimate that pay compression accounts for 80
percent of the reduction in the country’s share of highest aptitude teachers. Their
results suggest that performance-based pay di erentiation may provide incentives for
high-aptitude individuals to pursue careers in teaching.
4Aptitude in this study refers to percentile scores on the SAT and/or ACT examinations.Sally Hudson 10
In this paper, I do not attempt to identify the mechanism(s) through which TAP’s
performance awards a ect student achievement, though there is reason to believe my
estimates capture both the short-run and long-run e ects proposed by Lazear (2003).
Several of the schools in my sample have been employing TAP for more than eight
years, allowing time for local teachers to adjust their employment decisions in re-
sponse to di erential pay. None of the studies cited earlier present results from more
than two intervention years. Moreover, unlike schools in these temporary experi-
ments, most TAP schools intend to continue providing performance awards for the
foreseeable future, o ering teachers who move to TAP schools a longer time horizon
on which to collect higher pay.
Synthetic Control Matching
The methods employed in existing evaluations of performance-based pay interven-
tions are not suitable for analyzing the e ects of TAP. Unlike the programs in Kenya
and India, TAP is not randomly assigned to participating schools. TAP typically
operates in schools with low-performing and economically disadvantaged students, as
I demonstrate in the Data section. The intervention in Lavy (2009) also targeted
low-performing schools, but that program was explicitly assigned based on an ob-
served measure of school performance. Consequently, Lavy is able to use regression
discontinuity methods to estimate the di erence in achievement outcomes for schools
just above and below the threshold for assignment to treatment.5 Since TAP does
not explicitly select schools based on observable characteristics, I cannot use these
methods to evaluate its e ects.
Instead, I rely on synthetic control methods to compare achievement outcomes in
TAP schools to those of untreated schools. Synthetic control matching ﬁrst appeared
in the literature in Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and was later formalized and re-
5Lavy also identiﬁes measurement error in the variable used to assign treatment, which, in e ect,
produces a randomized treatment sample.Sally Hudson 11
ﬁned in Abadie et al. (2007). Synthetic control methods allow researchers to estimate
the e ects of interventions in which assignment to treatment is both non-random and
non-deterministic. The basic idea behind synthetic control matching is that a com-
bination of several untreated units can often provide a better comparison for each
treated unit than any single unit can alone. Consider a hypothetical TAP school
named George Washington Elementary. George Washington has certain observable
characteristics, such as its racial and ethnic composition and its student-teacher ratio.
It is unlikely that another school in George Washington’s area has exactly the same
traits. Some potential comparison schools may have more minority students, some
fewer; some may have more students per teacher; some fewer. The goal of synthetic
control matching is to combine data from all potential comparison schools to generate
a synthetic school that is as similar as possible to George Washington Elementary
prior to the TAP intervention.
More formally, consider a hypothetical intervention in a region with N+1 schools.
Suppose for the sake of simplicity that school t is the only treated school. Let Xt
be a k   1 vector of pre-intervention characteristics for school t, and let XU be a
k N matrix that contains the same variables for the N untreated schools. The basic





 Xt   XUW  s.t
N  
i=1
Wi = 1 (1)
That is, the algorithm identiﬁes the vector of non-negative weights that minimizes the
distance between the observed characteristics of the treated school and the untreated
schools. Each component Wi captures the extent to which school i contributes to
the synthetic version of school t. These weights are then used to generate data for
synthetic school t in the post-intervention period. The actual algorithm implementedSally Hudson 12
in Abadie et al. (2007) contains several additional reﬁnements, allowing in particular
for synthetic control matching based on trends in pre-intervention characteristics.
The primary advantage of synthetic control matching is that it does not rely on
ad hoc selection of appropriate comparison units. Ad hoc selection was common in
evaluations of school interventions prior to the advent of more sophisticated quasi-
experimental methods. Ladd (1996), for example, attempts to estimate the e ects of
a short-lived performance award program in the Dallas Independent School District
by comparing test scores from students in Dallas to test scores from Austin, El Paso,
Forth Worth, Houston, and San Antonio. Though each of these cities resembles Dallas
along some traits, it is unclear which city provides the most appropriate control for
the Dallas intervention. Synthetic control matching would have provided an objective
measure of the extent to which each of proposed comparison cities resembled Dallas
in the pre-intervention period.
To date, synthetic control methods have been used to study a wide variety of
interventions, policies, and shocks. Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) use synthetic
control matching to estimate the e ects of terrorist conﬂict on the Basque economy in
Spain. Moser (2005) constructs a synthetic Switzerland to analyze the impact of Swiss
patent laws. Abadie et al. (2007) study the e ects of a large-scale tobacco control
program in California in their seminal paper on synthetic control methods. More
recently, Fitzpatrick (2008) uses synthetic control matching to analyze the e ects of
universal pre-kindergarten on student achievement in Georgia.Sally Hudson 13
Data
I draw my sample from the 11 states that currently employ the TAP model as de-
scribed in the Background section.6 They are Arkansas, Colorado, Indiana, Louisiana,
Minnesota, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, and
Texas. The Louisiana Department of Education was unable to provide complete
achievement data for most of its TAP-a liated districts, many of which were a ected
by Hurricane Katrina, so I exclude Louisiana TAP schools from my sample. The
remaining 10 states provide an initial sample of 199 TAP schools.
I further exclude schools on the basis of several data restrictions. Because the syn-
thetic control algorithm matches schools based on their observed characteristics prior
to the intervention, I must exclude all schools for which there are no pre-TAP data.
This eliminates schools that implemented TAP during their ﬁrst year of operation or
prior to the ﬁrst year of available achievement data. I must also exclude schools for
which there are no post-intervention data. This eliminates all schools that introduced
TAP in the 2009-2010 school year since test scores from the current year have yet
to be released. Lastly, I exclude schools that do not serve grades in which students
take state achievement exams. This typically eliminates primary schools and high
schools that begin with grade 11. The ﬁnal sample contains 151 schools. Of these,
135 were active TAP schools during the 2008-2009 school year. Table 3 summarizes
the distribution of these schools across states and years.
I match TAP schools to synthetic controls using achievement and demographic
data from statewide assessments in each of the 10 sampled states. In all states, I use
grade-level mean scale scores in reading and mathematics from the same examinations
TAP schools use to determine performance awards. Table 27 in Appendix 2 lists the
examinations used in each state, along with the grades and years for which scores are
6Illinois also operates schools that are a liated with TAP, but these schools have implemented
a modiﬁed version of the TAP model described earlier and are therefore excluded from my analysis.Sally Hudson 14
Table 3: Active TAP Schools by State and Year
State 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Arkansas 2 1 1
Colorado 4 9 14 14 15 15 15
Indiana 3 7 7 7 11 11 11
Minnesota 3 8 10 16 15
North Carolina 1
Ohio 1 5 12 12
Pennsylvania 3 9
South Carolina 5 5 5 7 9 15 35 39
Tennessee 3 4 4
Texas 2 7 9 28
All States 5 12 21 31 41 68 106 135
Notes: Year column-headings refer to the spring term of each school year (i.e. 2002
is the 2001-2002 school year).
available. In keeping with federal requirements, state assessment data also identify
the number of test-takers in each grade by race, gender, disability, English language
proﬁciency, and eligibility for free and reduced-price school lunches. Some states have
moved more slowly than others to comply with these reporting requirements. Con-
sequently, grade-level demographic data from Arkansas, Indiana, and Tennessee are
unavailable for several of the years I study. I therefore report separate results for
states with and without these data.
I supplement demographic data from state achievement exams with school-level
demographic data from two sources: the Common Core of Data and the Private School
Universe Survey (PSS). Both databases are maintained by the National Center for
Education Statistics. The Common Core of Data surveys all U.S. public schools; the
PSS surveys U.S. private schools. Both datasets disaggregate school enrollment by
grade, race, and gender and contain data on student-teacher ratios. The free and
reduced-price lunch data are missing for most observations in Indiana and Pennsyl-
vania, so I obtain these variables directly from their state Departments of Education.Sally Hudson 15
Table 4: Pre-TAP Descriptive Statistics for All TAP Schools
# of schools = 151 Percentiles
Mean SD 10 25 50 75 90
Subject Z-Scores
Reading -1.28 1.02 -2.61 -2.10 -1.31 -0.45 0.06
Mathematics -1.22 0.98 -2.40 -2.04 -1.27 -0.44 0.12
Race
% White 29.9 26.5 2.1 6.4 22.9 48.4 67.7
% African American 47.4 33.3 0.71 20.0 47.8 78.5 95.7
% Hispanic 19.6 24.3 0.35 1.04 4.24 35.5 58.1
% Asian 2.7 5.7 0.0 0.2 0.6 2.3 6.9
% Native American 1.1 2.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.6 3.0
Economic Status
% Free Lunch Eligible 57.6 24.1 17.0 43.6 64.4 75.4 84.3
% Free or Reduced-Price 65.8 24.8 27.0 53.1 72.9 84.5 90.0
Lunch Eligible
Enrollment
Total Enrollment 571.5 238.9 312.7 409.7 549.6 683.8 818.6
Student-Teacher Ratio 15.1 2.5 12.6 13.7 14.6 16.1 18.5
Other
% Male 50.1 7.0 47.5 50.0 51.1 52.5 54.0
Notes: Variables are ﬁrst averaged at the school-level over all available pre-TAP years. School-
level averages are then weighted by total enrollment to produce the values reported above.
Reading and mathematics scores are reported as z-scores standardized at the state-grade-year
level and then averaged over tested grades within each school.
I present descriptive statistics for the full sample of TAP schools in Tables 4 and
5. Tables 17-26 of Appendix 2 contain descriptive statistics for TAP schools in each
state. Prior to the introduction of TAP, the average TAP school scores near its state’s
10th percentile in both reading and mathematics. The bottom 10 percent of TAP
schools are among the 1 percent of worst-performing schools in their states, while
the top 10 percent of TAP schools score just above their state means. The average
TAP school is majority non-white and economically disadvantaged, as measured bySally Hudson 16
Table 5: Pre-TAP Descriptive Statistics for All TAP Schools
# of schools = 134 Percentiles
Mean SD 10 25 50 75 90
% Special Education 9.8 5.2 3.9 5.4 9.2 13.9 17.4
% LEP 9.6 14.2 0.0 0.4 2.7 13.5 36.9
Notes: Excludes 17 TAP schools in Arkansas, Indiana, and Tennessee as these
states do not report special education and LEP data prior to TAP. Variables
reported in Table 4 are omitted as their values are similar to the full sample
results.
students’ eligibility for free and reduced-price school lunches. The distribution of lim-
ited English proﬁciency (LEP) students among TAP schools is strongly right skewed,
with a small number of schools serving student bodies that are nearly half LEP. Not
surprisingly, TAP schools in Texas and Colorado serve more Hispanic students on
average than TAP schools nationwide, though TAP schools in Minnesota have the
highest fraction of LEP students.
Empirical Methodology
Synthetic Control Matching
I match TAP schools to synthetic controls using the synth package for STATA
developed by Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller. The synth command requires the
user to specify an outcome variable, a set of predictor variables, and a “donor pool”
of candidate control units for each treated unit. I generate separate synthetic controls
for reading and mathematics outcomes in order to allow the e ects of TAP to vary
across subjects. In practice, however, both speciﬁcations tend to identify the same
control schools with similar weights.
Each set of predictor variables contains school-level demographic traits and grade-
level z-scores. At minimum, demographic variables include total enrollment, student-Sally Hudson 17
teacher ratio, and share of enrollment by gender, race, and eligibility for free and
reduced-price school lunches. I also include the share of students enrolled in special
education and LEP programs for all states except Arkansas, Indiana, and Tennessee.
In several of the sampled states, the set of tested grades expands during the study
period. I incorporate z-scores from these additional grades as they become available.
Minnesota, for example, did not administer tests in grades 6 and 8 until 2006. I
therefore match Minnesota middle schools using grade 7 test scores through 2005 and
grades 6, 7, and 8 thereafter.
The initial donor pool for each TAP school contains all non-TAP schools serving
the same grade range in its state.7 Because the synth command requires that pools
contain no more than 75 schools, I further restrict each pool to schools that fall
within a standard deviation of the given TAP school on all predictor variables. If
the resulting pool is still too large, I impose successively tighter bounds until the
pool is su ciently small. Though pools may contain as many as 75 schools, the
synthetic control algorithm rarely draws on every candidate control supplied. The
median number of schools used to generate each synthetic control is ﬁve.
The synth command produces a vector of weights that indicates the extent to
which each candidate control school contributes to the synthetic control. I use these
vectors to generate demographic and achievement data for synthetic control schools.
Formally, each datum for a given synthetic control is a linear combination of the
corresponding data from its donor pool, where the synth output vector supplies the
scalar weights. Table 6 presents summary statistics for an example TAP school and
its synthetic control. Note that z-scores are matched year-by-year to ensure that the
treated and synthetic control schools follow the same trend in achievement prior to
TAP. Total enrollment is typically the most poorly matched predictor variable, as it
is in Table 6.
7Indiana has implemented TAP in two Catholic archdiocese. For these TAP schools, I further
restrict donor pools to Christian parochial schools.Sally Hudson 18
Table 6: Example Synthetic Control Match




Reading - Grade 7 (2004) -1.393 -1.391
Reading - Grade 7 (2005) -1.526 -1.556
Race
% White 34.8 32.6
% African American 37.3 39.4
% Hispanic 15.0 13.1
% Asian 7.5 8.0
% Native American 5.3 6.9
Economic Status
% Free Lunch Eligible 65.0 64.6
% Reduced-Price Lunch 8.6 9.7
Eligible
Enrollment
Total Enrollment 524 400.6
Student-Teacher Ratio 14.8 14.9
Other
% Male 48.8 51.8
% Special Education 17.9 15.1
% LEP 13.7 13.9
Notes: Demographic variables are averaged over the pre-
TAP period.Sally Hudson 19
Di erence-in-Di erences Estimation
I use synth scalar weights to generate panel data for each synthetic control at the
school-grade-year level. I then exploit variation in the timing of TAP participation to
estimate the e ect of TAP on measured achievement using a di erence-in-di erences
model. I estimate models of the following general form :
Zgist =   +  I
TAP
i +  I
active
it +  (I
TAP
i   I
active
it ) +   (2)
where Zgist is the z-score for grade g of school i in state s and year t. The dummy
variable ITAP
i takes the value 1 if school i is a TAP school and 0 if school i is a
synthetic control. The dummy variable Iactive
it indicates whether the TAP program
was active in school i’s matched pair during year t. That is, if school i is a TAP
school, then Iactive
it is 1 if school i employed TAP in year t. If school i is a synthetic
control, then Iactive
it is 1 if the corresponding treated school employed TAP in year
t. The di erence-in-di erences estimator is  , the coe cient on the interaction term
ITAP
i   Iactive
it . This parameter captures the e ect on achievement of being a TAP
school when TAP is actively in place.
I improve upon this baseline speciﬁcation by including grade, school, state, and
year controls. Formally, I estimate
Zgist =   +  I
TAP
i +  I
active
it +  (I
TAP
i   I
active
it ) + Xgit  +  g +  s +  t +   (3)
where Xgit is a vector of grade and school-level demographic controls and  g,  s, and
 t are grade, state, and year ﬁxed-e ects, respectively. Note that this speciﬁcation
allows for the inclusion of all schools that ever participated in TAP, including those
that have discontinued the intervention. In order to determine whether the e ects
of TAP di er for schools that have and have not sustained the program, I estimateSally Hudson 20
equation (3) both with and without schools that discontinue TAP. I also analyze
whether the e ects of TAP vary with the duration of the program by estimating (3)
with one and two-year lagged outcomes.
Though the synth algorithm attempts to generate synthetic controls that follow
the same trend in achievement as their treated counterparts prior to the interven-
tion, a perfect match is not always possible, especially in schools with several treated
grades. I therefore use a detrended di erence-in-di erences estimation model to ac-
count for di erential linear trends in pre-TAP achievement. I ﬁrst estimate the pre-
TAP achievement trend for each school by regressing subject z-scores on a full set
of school dummies interacted with a discrete time variable for all years prior to the
intervention. Formally, I estimate
Zgist =  1(d1   t) +  2(d2   t) + ··· +  N(dN   t) (4)
where di is a dummy for school i, and t = 0 for the year 2000, t = 1 for 2001,
and so on. The estimated coe cient ˆ  i capture the pre-TAP trend in achievement
for school i. I use these estimates to predict achievement in each school during the
post-TAP period: ˆ Ztrend
gist = ˆ  it. I subtract these predicted z-scores from the observed
values to obtain detrended z-scores: ˆ Zdetrend
gist = Zgist   ˆ Ztrend
gist . I then re-estimate the
speciﬁcation in (3) using the detrended z-scores:
ˆ Z
detrend
gist =   +  I
TAP
i +  I
active
it +  (I
TAP
i   I
active
it ) + Xgit  +  g +  s +  t +   (5)
Results
I present estimates from the baseline di erence-in-di erences model in Tables
7 and 8. The dependent variables in both tables are subject z-scores, so coe cient
estimates measure the fraction of a standard deviation by which test scores in TAPSally Hudson 21
Table 7: Di erence-in-Di erences Estimates, Reading
Speciﬁcation (1) (2) (3) (4)
TAP Dummy -0.37*** -0.23*** -0.21*** -0.23***
(0.12) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
Active Dummy 0.20** 0.04 0.08* 0.05
(0.09) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Interaction Term 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.11*
(0.14) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06)
Total Enrollment 0.0008*** 0.0003 0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Student-Teacher Ratio -0.02* 0.01 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
% Male 0.23 -0.88** -1.15*
(0.38) (0.42) (0.62)
% White 3.84 -3.02 -4.52
(3.25) (3.72) (4.11)
% African American 1.98 -4.85 -6.47
(3.26) (3.72) (4.10)
% Hispanic 2.61 -4.96 -6.03
(3.24) (3.73) (4.10)
% Asian 0.88 -5.49 -6.55
(3.24) (3.74) (4.10)
% Native American -2.56 -7.99** -9.31***
(3.43) (3.91) (4.31)
% Free Lunch Eligible -1.85** -1.13* -1.60**
(0.76) (0.67) (0.73)
% Free or Reduced-Price 0.70 -0.18 0.42
Lunch Eligible (0.68) (0.61) (0.71)




Constant -1.05*** -3.31 3.65 5.22
(0.07) (3.29) (3.78) (4.09)
Grade Fixed E ects No No Yes Yes
State Fixed E ects No No Yes Yes
Year Fixed E ects No No Yes Yes
# of TAP Schools 151 147 147 134
Adjusted R2 0.032 0.509 0.588 0.573
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the school-level and presented in parentheses.
* p < 0.1
** p < 0.05
*** p < 0.01Sally Hudson 22
Table 8: Di erence-in-Di erences Estimates, Mathematics
Speciﬁcation (1) (2) (3) (4)
TAP Dummy -0.32*** -1.56** -0.15** -0.17**
(0.12) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08)
Active Dummy 0.18** 0.03 0.01 0.002
(0.09) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Interaction Term 0.17 0.10 0.10 0.13*
(-1.04) (0.08) 0.05) (0.08)
Total Enrollment 0.0009*** 0.0005 0.0004*
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Student-Teacher Ratio -0.01 0.02 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
% Male 0.27 -0.56 -1.22**
(0.38) (0.42) (0.61)
% White 1.96 1.31 1.24
(3.28) (4.15) (4.89)
% African American -0.32 -0.79 -1.15
(3.29) (4.14) (4.87)
% Hispanic 0.50 -0.31 -0.52
(3.26) (4.14) (4.88)
% Asian 0.37 0.33 0.12
(3.28) (4.14) (4.86)
% Native American -5.60* -3.47 -3.88***
(3.39) (4.47) (5.19)
% Free Lunch Eligible -1.62** -0.88 -1.04**
(0.71) (0.70) (0.80)
% Free or Reduced-Price 0.97 -0.03 0.36
Lunch Eligible (0.66) (0.66) (0.77)




Constant -1.04*** -1.70 -0.57 -0.27
(0.08) (3.29) (4.20) (4.90)
Grade Fixed E ects No No Yes Yes
State Fixed E ects No No Yes Yes
Year Fixed E ects No No Yes Yes
# of TAP Schools 151 147 147 134
Adjusted R2 0.026 0.480 0.527 0.511
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the school-level and presented in parentheses.
* p < 0.1
** p < 0.05
*** p < 0.01Sally Hudson 23
schools and synthetic controls di er. In both reading and math, the coe cient esti-
mates for the interaction term are not signiﬁcant at any conventional level in columns
(1), (2), and (3). When controls for special education and LEP enrollment are added
in column (4), estimates for both subjects are signiﬁcant at the 90 percent level. The
estimated e ect is 0.11 in reading and 0.13 in math. That is, TAP is associated with
an improvement of roughly one-tenth of a standard deviation on examinations in both
subjects.
Most coe cient estimates for the demographic covariates are not statistically sig-
niﬁcant, with the exception of the controls for the fraction of male, Native American,
and free lunch eligible enrollment. Estimated coe cients for all three of these vari-
ables are large and negative. The fraction of LEP enrollment also appears to have a
signiﬁcant negative e ect on reading achievement, though no e ect in math. These
general results persist in the other speciﬁcations I estimate, so I omit demographic
covariate results from the remaining tables in order to focus attention on the coe -
cients of interest.
Tables 7 and 8 o er one other important result. In all four speciﬁcations in each
subject, the coe cients on the TAP dummy variable are negative and highly signiﬁ-
cant. Given that synthetic controls are matched based on pre-TAP achievement, we
should not expect to ﬁnd signiﬁcant coe cient estimates for the assignment to treat-
ment dummy. These results suggest that the synthetic control algorithm could not
perfectly match pre-intervention achievement trends for several TAP schools. Indeed,
as Figures 1 and 2 indicate, the pre-TAP achievement trends for synthetic controls are
often slightly higher than the trends for their corresponding TAP schoosl.8 Figures
1 and 2 plot pre-TAP trends in z-scores for TAP schools against the trends for their
synthetic controls. Observations below the 45 degree line indicate pairs in which the
8Inspection of individual pairs reveals that these matches may have been unavoidable. Several
TAP schools have such low test scores and negative achievement trends in the pre-intervention period
that virtually any weighted-average of candidate controls would result in synthetic test scores that
are strictly higher in both level and trendSally Hudson 24
Figure 1: Pre-TAP Trends in Reading Z-Scores
Figure 2: Pre-TAP Trends in Mathematics Z-ScoresSally Hudson 25
Table 9: Detrended Di erence-in-Di erences Estimates, Reading
Speciﬁcation (3) (4)
TAP Dummy -0.04 -0.03
(0.03) (0.03)
Active Dummy -0.10 -0.01
(0.11) (0.12)
Interaction Term 0.15** 0.13**
(0.06) (0.06)
Demographic Controls Yes Yes
Special Education and LEP Controls No Yes
Grade Fixed E ects Yes Yes
State Fixed E ects Yes Yes
Year Fixed E ects Yes Yes
# of TAP Schools 72 65
Adjusted R2 0.155 0.199
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the school-level and presented in paren-
theses.
* p < 0.1
** p < 0.05
*** p < 0.01
synthetic control has a higher pre-TAP trend in achievement than its associated TAP
school. These observations account for the negative coe cient estimates on the TAP
dummy variables in Tables 7 and 8.
The results from Tables 7 and 8 motivate the use of detrending to remove the
e ect of di erential pre-TAP achievement trends. I present estimates from the de-
trended di erence-in-di erences model in Tables 9 and 10. Estimated e ects in both
subjects are positive and signiﬁcant at the 95 percent level. The estimated e ects
with the full set of demographic controls are slightly higher than the original esti-
mates: 0.13 in reading and 0.15 in mathematics. It is reassuring that the detrended
point estimates are similar to those from the original speciﬁcations. Detrending does
not substantially alter the estimated e ect of TAP; it o ers more precise estimates
by removing the noise from pre-TAP achievement trends.Sally Hudson 26
Table 10: Detrended Di erence-in-Di erences Estimates, Mathematics
Speciﬁcation (3) (4)
TAP Dummy -0.05 -0.02
(0.03) (0.03)
Active Dummy 0.02 0.13
(0.11) (0.11)
Interaction Term 0.18*** 0.15**
(0.06) (0.07)
Demographic Controls Yes Yes
Special Education and LEP Controls No Yes
Grade Fixed E ects Yes Yes
State Fixed E ects Yes Yes
Year Fixed E ects Yes Yes
# of TAP Schools 72 65
Adjusted R2 0.063 0.062
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the school-level and presented in paren-
theses.
* p < 0.1
** p < 0.05
*** p < 0.01
To assess how the e ects of TAP vary with the program’s duration, I also estimate
the di erence-in-di erences model with one and two-year lagged outcomes. I compare
these results to the previous estimates in Table 11. The lagged math e ects are both
signiﬁcant at the 95 percent level, with point estimates of roughly 0.2. Neither of the
lagged reading estimates is signiﬁcant at any conventional level.
The results in Table 11 suggest two general conclusions. First, students in TAP
schools outperform students in comparison schools by roughly 0.15 standard devia-
tions on statewide mathematics assessments. These results are robust to several spec-
iﬁcations of the model, including detrending and lagged outcomes. Second, TAP’s
e ect on reading achievement is both smaller and less precisely estimated. This is a
typical result in empirical evaluations of education interventions – and for good rea-
son. Schools simply have smaller and more variable inﬂuence over students’ reading
ability. While children develop their language skills both at home and in school, chil-Sally Hudson 27
Table 11: Results of Di erence-in-Di erences Estimation
Reading Mathematics
Di -in-Di  0.109* 0.127*
(0.065) (0.075)
Detrended Di -in-Di  0.134*** 0.152**
(0.068) (0.083)
One Year Lag 0.051 0.218**
(0.074) (0.086)
Two Year Lag 0.076 0.244**
(0.098) (0.108)
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the school-level and pre-
sented in parentheses. All speciﬁcations include the full set of
demographic controls along with year, state, and grade ﬁxed ef-
fects.
* p < 0.1
** p < 0.05
*** p < 0.01
dren tend to learn math almost exclusively through their schoolwork. For whatever
reason, families just spend less time teaching math outside of school. Consequently,
schools tend to have more direct control over math skills than reading ability. The
unobserved variation in students’ home language learning generates noise in reading
achievement data, resulting in imprecise estimates of reading e ects.
Conclusions
In order to provide some context for my estimates, I conclude by comparing my
results to those of other education interventions. First, note that my results are sim-
ilar in magnitude to those obtained from experimental performance-based pay trials
conducted outside the United States. Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2009) ﬁnd
e ects of 0.16 and 0.28 standard deviations in reading and mathematics, respectively,Sally Hudson 28
and Glewwe et al. (2009) ﬁnd e ects ranging from 0.14 to 0.34 standard deviations
across several subjects. The similarities between our results suggest that performance-
based pay can have positive e ects on teacher productivity in a variety of di erent
cultural and economic settings.
Second, TAP’s e ect on achievement is large relative to other education interven-
tions in the U.S. Consider the e ect of class size reductions, one of the most popular
education reforms schools have attempted. In terms of expenditures, reducing class
size has been the single most prominent education reform in the U.S. in the last 50
years.9 Experimental estimates from the now famous Project STAR ﬁnd that a 10
percent reduction in class size led to an average improvement of 0.06 standard devi-
ations on the Stanford Achievement Test (Krueger 1999).10 The estimated e ect of
TAP on mathematics achievement is more than twice as large.
Moreover, TAP is inexpensive relative to class size reductions. The average per
pupil cost of implementing TAP is $450. A 10 percent reduction in class size, mean-
while, typically requires a 10 percent increase in per pupil expenditures (Hoxby 2000).
Given average per pupil spending, it follows that a 10 percent reduction in class size
costs about $1,150 per pupil. Combining these estimates with the results from Project
STAR, we ﬁnd that TAP o ers more than twice the e ect of class size reductions at
roughly 40 percent of the cost per pupil.
It is important to note that the results I present in this paper make no attempt
to explain how TAP inﬂuences student achievement. They do not isolate the e ect of
TAP’s performance awards from the impact of other program components. Disentan-
gling the e ect of performance awards from other TAP elements is di cult because
funding for bonuses is not randomly assigned to TAP schools. Schools determine for
9Class size reductions from 1960 to 2005 account for about half of the total increase in per pupil
expenditures.
10These results are actually larger than many estimates of class size e ects since Project STAR
had several problems with attrition and non-random assignment. For a thorough discussion see
Lehrer (2004).Sally Hudson 29
themselves how much funding to dedicate to bonus pools, so award values may be
driven by other factors that inﬂuence TAP’s impact, such as administrators’ overall
support for the program. Since bonus funding is endogenously determined, I do not
attempt to estimate how the e ect of TAP varies with the size of o ered awards at
this time. Given that teacher training programs have historically proven ine ective,
however, there is reason to believe that TAP’s e ects on student achievement are due
in large part to its performance-based compensation scheme.
Finally, when considering the policy implications of my results, it is crucial to
remember that any e ective incentive scheme will elicit the behavior it rewards. TAP
rewards teachers for improving students’ scores on state achievement exams, so it
should not be surprising that students of TAP teachers score higher on these tests.
To expect otherwise, we would have to believe that teachers either do not value TAP’s
bonuses or are unable to improve measured achievement. My estimates show that
rewarding teachers for student outcomes can a ect the outcomes students achieve,
but they say nothing about what kind of achievement ought to be rewarded or how it
should be measured. Deciding what counts as productive education is a complex task.
Measuring desired outcomes is another challenge altogether. Some kinds of produc-
tive teaching may be more di cult to measure and reward than others. These are all
questions that must be addressed, and they will not have easy answers. Still, evidence
that performance-based pay for teachers can a ect student achievement should moti-
vate educators and policy makers alike to design compensation schemes that reward
the outcomes they desire most.Sally Hudson 30
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Appendix 1: Calculating TAP Bonuses
In this section, I present an explicit example to demonstrate how TAP performance
awards are calculated. For the sake of simplicity, consider a school with just ﬁve
teachers, all of whom have individual value-added data. Suppose these teachers earn
the following scores for the three components of their awards:
Table 12: Scores for Example Calculations
Instructional Teacher School
Evaluations Value-Added Value-Added
Teacher A 2 2 3
Teacher B 2.5 3 3
Teacher C 3 3 3
Teacher D 3 4 3
Teacher E 4.5 5 3
Note that instructional evaluation scores are rounded to the nearest 0.5, and all
teachers have the same school value-added score. If the school allocates $3,000 in
bonus funding for each teacher, then a total of $15,000 will be available for awards.
As discussed in the Background section, 50 percent of this pool will be used for
instructional evaluation awards, 30 percent for teacher value-added awards, and 20
percent for school value-added awards.
I begin by calculating the instructional evaluation awards. As Table 13 indicates,
each teacher’s score corresponds to a “pay ratio.” Pay ratios are used to weight scores
so that teachers with higher scores earn larger shares of the award pool. Notice that
the pay ratios are 0 for all scores less than 2.5 because 2.5 is the minimum qualifying
score for an instructional evaluation bonus. To obtain the last column, multiply each
score’s pay ratio by the number of teachers with that score. The “Total Shares” value
is the sum of the values in this column. It indicates that a total of 10 shares will be
paid for instructional evaluation bonuses. Half of the total pool is reserved for these
bonuses, so each of the 10 shares is worth $750. Teachers C and D earned two sharesSally Hudson 34
Table 13: Computing Instructional Evaluation Awards
Score # of Teachers Pay Ratio # of Teachers   Pay Ratio
1 0 0 0
1.5 0 0 0
2 1 0 0
2.5 0 1 0
3 2 2 4
3.5 0 3 0
4 0 5 0
4.5 1 6 6
5 0 7 0
Total Shares 10
Pool Value $7,500
Value Per Share $750
each, so they each receive bonuses of $1,500. Teacher E earned six shares, so she
receives a bonus of $4,500.
I repeat this process to determine teacher value-added bonuses. Table 14 presents
the calculations for these awards. Recall that 3 is the minimum qualifying score for
a teacher value-added award, so pay ratios for all scores less than 3 are 0. The pool
value for these bonuses is $4,500, which is 30 percent of the total pool. As the table
indicates, 18 shares have been earned, so each share is worth $250. Teachers B and
C receive bonuses of $250 for earning one share, Teacher D receives $1,500 for six
shares, and Teacher E receives $2,500 for 10 shares.
All teachers earn the same share of the their school’s value-added bonus. Table
15 indicates the fraction of bonus funds awarded for each value-added score. Since
the school in this example earned a score of 3, it distributes 50% of the funds reserved
for school value-added bonuses. The ﬁve teachers split these $1,500 evenly, so each
teacher earns an additional $300 in school value-added awards.
I summarize the bonuses paid to each teacher in Table 16. These results highlight
a few important facets of TAP’s compensation scheme. First, a teacher’s bonus maySally Hudson 35
Table 14: Computing Teacher Value-Added Awards
Score # of Teachers Pay Ratio # of Teachers   Pay Ratio
1 0 0 0
2 1 0 0
3 2 1 2
4 1 6 6
5 1 10 10
Total Shares 18
Pool Value $4,500
Value Per Share $250
depend heavily on the performance of her colleagues. High-performing instructors
like Teacher E can potentially earn large individual bonuses if their fellow teachers
are relatively unsuccessful. These incentives could attract high quality teachers to
struggling schools where they are likely to be among a small group of bonus earners.
By extension, the ﬁnancial incentives for high-performing teachers to help improve
the scores of low-performing teachers may be small at best. Suppose Teachers A and
B were to increase their value-added scores so that the overall school value-added
score became 4. Teacher E’s school-level bonus would increase to $450, but this
gain would be more than o set by reductions to her individual bonuses. Granted,
these reductions would be smaller in an example that included more teachers, but the
underlying principle would persist. Even though teachers’ performance is measured on
absolute scales, teachers’ bonuses depend on their relative performance among their
colleagues. This is not to say that TAP’s compensation scheme provides teachers
Table 15: Computing School Value-Added Awards
Score Fraction of Funds Awarded Value of Funds Awarded
1 0 % 0
2 0 % 0
3 50 % $1,500
4 75 % $2,250
5 100 % $3,000Sally Hudson 36
Table 16: Calculated Bonuses
Instructional Teacher School
Evaluations Value-Added Value-Added Total
Teacher A 0 0 $300 $300
Teacher B 0 $250 $300 $550
Teacher C $1,500 $250 $300 $2,050
Teacher D $1,500 $1,500 $300 $3,800
Teacher E $4,500 $2,500 $300 $7,300
with perverse incentives. Every teacher stands to earn more if he performs better,
so TAP should encourage all teachers to improve their instruction. Still, it would
be incorrect to say that TAP’s performance awards do not provide incentives for
competition among teachers in the same school.Sally Hudson 37
Appendix 2: State-Level Tables
Table 17: Pre-TAP Descriptive Statistics – Arkansas
# of schools = 2 Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Subject Z-Scores
Reading -0.43 0.29 -0.61 0.05
Mathematics -0.22 0.17 -0.33 0.06
Race
% White 61.5 35.0 4.4 82.9
% African American 26.1 42.2 0.2 94.9
% Hispanic 6.0 3.6 0.1 8.3
% Asian 3.8 2.0 0.6 5.1
% Native American 2.5 1.5 0 3.5
Economic Status
% Free Lunch Eligible 60.3 13.7 52.0 82.7
% Free or Reduced-Price 73.6 10.6 67.1 90.9
Lunch Eligible
Enrollment
Total Enrollment 490.0 164.6 221.6 590.8
Student-Teacher Ratio 16.3 0.3 15.9 16.4
Other
% Male 48.2 3.2 43.0 50.2
Notes: See Table 4.Sally Hudson 38
Table 18: Pre-TAP Descriptive Statistics – Colorado
# of schools = 15 Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Subject Z-Scores
Reading 0.20 0.85 -1.45 1.49
Mathematics 0.25 0.71 -0.90 1.37
Race
% White 56.8 18.9 21.2 84.0
% African American 0.9 0.8 0.2 2.5
% Hispanic 40.2 21.0 7.2 77.9
% Asian 1.7 1.8 0.3 5.5
% Native American 0.5 0.3 0 1.2
Economic Status
% Free Lunch Eligible 17.7 12.4 2.2 41.8
% Free or Reduced-Price 23.9 15.5 3.5 51.5
Lunch Eligible
Enrollment
Total Enrollment 526.0 288.7 178.4 1057.3
Student-Teacher Ratio 15.1 1.4 12.0 16.8
Other
% Male 52.1 2.0 47.9 57.5
% Special Education 9.5 2.5 5.5 15.1
% LEP 31.7 21.1 1.1 70.3
Notes: See Table 4.Sally Hudson 39
Table 19: Pre-TAP Descriptive Statistics – Indiana
# of schools = 11 Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Subject Z-Scores
Reading -0.28 1.14 -2.84 0.77
Mathematics -0.10 1.14 -2.58 1.11
Race
% White 82.6 26.6 0.3 98.2
% African American 11.6 25.2 0 99.1
% Hispanic 4.6 10.8 0.3 51.4
% Asian 1.1 1.1 0 3.5
% Native American 0.04 0.1 0 0.2
Economic Status
% Free Lunch Eligible 13.7 21.5 0.1 68.6
% Free or Reduced-Price 18.0 26.0 0.3 82.0
Lunch Eligible
Enrollment
Total Enrollment 437.8 188.9 159.5 671.0
Student-Teacher Ratio 18.0 2.8 12.1 22.5
Other
% Male 52.7 2.6 48.7 56.9
Notes: See Table 4.Sally Hudson 40
Table 20: Pre-TAP Descriptive Statistics – Minnesota
# of schools = 19 Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Subject Z-Scores
Reading -2.21 0.83 -3.08 0.24
Mathematics -1.95 0.72 -2.91 -0.03
Race
% White 16.7 13.1 1.8 49.8
% African American 44.7 15.0 25.6 85.3
% Hispanic 22.8 19.7 1.1 58.9
% Asian 11.6 10.2 0.4 41.0
% Native American 4.1 3.0 0.4 12.1
Economic Status
% Free Lunch Eligible 71.7 12.7 35.2 86.6
% Free or Reduced-Price 79.2 12.2 43.7 93.5
Lunch Eligible
Enrollment
Total Enrollment 651.7 269.5 242.3 1284.5
Student-Teacher Ratio 16.0 2.3 12.3 23.0
Other
% Male 50.9 2.5 46.1 56.9
% Special Education 13.6 3.2 9.1 19.2
% LEP 33.4 12.7 10.4 55.2
Notes: See Table 4.Sally Hudson 41
Table 21: Pre-TAP Descriptive Statistics – North Carolina
# of schools = 1 Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Subject Z-Scores
Reading -0.34 — — —
Mathematics -0.31 — — —
Race
% White 23.2 — — —
% African American 51.1 — — —
% Hispanic 16.7 — — —
% Asian 6.2 — — —
% Native American 0.3 — — —
Economic Status
% Free Lunch Eligible 43.2 — — —
% Free or Reduced-Price 53.1 — — —
Lunch Eligible
Enrollment
Total Enrollment 931.3 — — —
Student-Teacher Ratio 13.8 — — —
Other
% Male 49.1 — — —
Notes: See Table 4.Sally Hudson 42
Table 22: Pre-TAP Descriptive Statistics – Ohio
# of schools = 12 Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Subject Z-Scores
Reading -2.03 0.48 -2.91 -1.07
Mathematics -1.87 0.38 -2.47 -1.15
Race
% White 20.2 23.8 0.5 73.3
% African American 72.5 25.6 13.9 98.5
% Hispanic 3.4 5.7 0.04 20.8
% Asian 1.4 1.3 0.1 4.7
% Native American 0.2 0.2 0 0.6
Economic Status
% Free Lunch Eligible 70.6 12.2 47.4 92.5
% Free or Reduced-Price 76.7 11.2 55.4 96.1
Lunch Eligible
Enrollment
Total Enrollment 450.8 119.5 243.3 604.0
Student-Teacher Ratio 17.7 2.3 15.0 23.3
Other
% Male 51.1 2.4 45.7 54.2
% Special Education 18.7 4.3 6.3 24.4
% LEP 4.5 7.4 0 28.0
% Gifted 14.5 7.7 1.9 23.9
Notes: See Table 4.Sally Hudson 43
Table 23: Pre-TAP Descriptive Statistics – Pennsylvania
# of schools = 9 Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Subject Z-Scores
Reading -1.97 0.27 -2.43 -1.49
Mathematics -2.09 0.28 -2.53 -1.29
Race
% White 0.1 0.2 0 0.7
% African American 91.6 19.8 10.4 99.8
% Hispanic 7.9 19.6 0.1 88.7
% Asian 0.2 0.3 0 0.9
% Native American 0.03 0.04 0 0.1
Economic Status
% Free Lunch Eligible 44.4 19.0 0 71.2
% Free or Reduced-Price 50.8 22.2 0 87.1
Lunch Eligible
Enrollment
Total Enrollment 538.9 195.7 207.3 817.5
Student-Teacher Ratio 18.0 1.9 14.4 21.0
Other
% Male 44.5 5.5 35.2 51.6
% Special Education 12.4 4.2 8.5 23.7
% LEP 1.9 7.7 0 35.5
Notes: See Table 4.Sally Hudson 44
Table 24: Pre-TAP Descriptive Statistics – South Carolina
# of schools = 46 Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Subject Z-Scores
Reading -1.44 0.92 -3.08 0.91
Mathematics -1.36 0.92 -2.87 0.69
Race
% White 29.0 21.2 0.2 97.9
% African American 66.9 22.3 0.3 99.3
% Hispanic 2.4 3.0 0 16.4
% Asian 0.7 0.1 0 4.9
% Native American 0.9 3.0 0 16.3
Economic Status
% Free Lunch Eligible 70.4 13.0 38.8 90.0
% Free or Reduced-Price 78.8 11.7 54.3 95.3
Lunch Eligible
Enrollment
Total Enrollment 519.0 143.3 134.7 799.5
Student-Teacher Ratio 13.7 1.4 9.9 16.1
Other
% Male 51.7 1.9 40.3 56.8
% Special Education 10.0 3.6 0.5 16.0
% LEP 2.1 3.1 0 16.0
Notes: See Table 4.Sally Hudson 45
Table 25: Pre-TAP Descriptive Statistics – Tennessee
# of schools = 4 Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Subject Z-Scores
Reading -0.36 0.21 -0.79 -0.11
Mathematics -0.33 0.16 -0.58 -0.12
Race
% White 64.3 14.1 36.5 80.0
% African American 28.5 9.2 17.6 46.0
% Hispanic 5.6 4.6 1.6 17.0
% Asian 1.5 1.5 0.4 4.9
% Native American 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2
Economic Status
% Free Lunch Eligible 55.5 14.3 35.9 70.9
% Free or Reduced-Price 62.2 12.6 45.7 79.6
Lunch Eligible
Enrollment
Total Enrollment 685.0 235.1 270.8 879.8
Student-Teacher Ratio 15.7 1.9 13.4 18.2
Other
% Male 34.8 2.2 33.1 40.5
Notes: See Table 4.Sally Hudson 46
Table 26: Pre-TAP Descriptive Statistics – Texas
# of schools = 29 Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Subject Z-Scores
Reading -0.84 0.49 -1.60 0.36
Mathematics -0.85 0.53 -1.92 0.51
Race
% White 19.4 15.7 1.9 80.5
% African American 28.2 26.5 0.4 89.5
% Hispanic 51.3 22.9 8.4 93.4
% Asian 1.0 1.4 0 6.0
% Native American 0.2 0.3 0 2.1
Economic Status
% Free Lunch Eligible 59.9 17.8 0 90.9
% Free or Reduced-Price 70.6 17.5 0 96.8
Lunch Eligible
Enrollment
Total Enrollment 620.2 199.0 57.5 969.6
Student-Teacher Ratio 14.2 2.0 4.5 20.5
Other
% Male 52.0 3.1 48.3 74.6
% Special Education 5.6 2.2 1.3 15.8
% LEP 4.4 3.8 0.08 14.1
% Gifted 7.3 2.8 0.3 15.8
Notes: See Table 4.Sally Hudson 47
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